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Available online 20 January 2017AbstractPurpose: Reﬂection in medical diagnosis has been said to prevent errors by minimizing ﬂaws in clinical reasoning. This claim,
however, has been much disputed. While some studies show reﬂective reasoning to improve diagnostic performance, others ﬁnd it
to add nothing. This paper presents a narrative review of the literature on reﬂection in medical diagnosis aimed at addressing two
questions: (1) how reﬂective reasoning has been conceived in this literature; and (2) what is the effect of different forms of
reﬂective reasoning on diagnostic performance.
Method: We searched PubMed and Web of Science for papers published until June 2016 and identiﬁed additional literature
through the list of references from the initial publications. By building upon dual-processing theories of reasoning, we classiﬁed
the empirical studies according to two dimensions: (1) the phase of the diagnostic process in which reﬂection was applied, and
(2) the type of reasoning instructions provided to participants.
Results: We identiﬁed 46 papers for full review, 31 of them reporting on empirical studies. Different conceptualizations of
reﬂective reasoning exist in the literature. In 16 studies, reﬂective reasoning was triggered to verify previously generated
diagnosis, usually (13/16 studies) by following speciﬁc reasoning instructions. Participants were requested to reﬂect for generating
diagnostic hypothesis in 4 studies, all using speciﬁc instructions. In 8 studies, 2 of them employing speciﬁc instructions, reﬂection
was assumed as taking place throughout the diagnostic process. Reﬂective reasoning positively affected diagnostic performance
when conceived as a process of examining the grounds of initial diagnoses generated through intuitive judgment. The beneﬁts of
reﬂection were particularly substantial when physicians were provided with speciﬁc reasoning instructions that led them to be
confronted with evidence from the case. Studies using other forms of reﬂection led to contradictory ﬁndings.
Discussion: Reﬂective reasoning can be a powerful tool to reduce diagnostic errors and increase diagnostic performance. For this
to happen, reﬂection should be triggered for diagnosis veriﬁcation and needs to interfere with initial diagnostic reasoning, which
requires confrontation with evidence from the case.
& 2017 King Saud bin AbdulAziz University for Health Sciences. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Anecdotes about clinicians who diagnose a patient's
problem in an instant are common in clinical settings
and have always enchanted students and medical staff
alike. No matter how much fascination diagnosis in the
blink of an eye can hold, physicians are, however,
usually recommended to stay away from it. Clinical
teachers advise medical students to “do not jump to
conclusions” before completing a comprehensive pro-
cess of gathering information from the patient. And the
recommendation does not apply only to novice diag-
nosticians. Practicing physicians have been warned as
well about the perils of relying on fast, intuitive
diagnostic reasoning, which has often been appointed
as a source of diagnostic errors.1,2 By reﬂecting upon
the case and carefully considering all available infor-
mation, it is said, physicians would avoid reasoning
ﬂaws that underlie most mistakes. Such a claim,
however, is far from consensual.3,4 Indeed, while some
studies have shown reﬂection to improve diagnoses,5,6
others have found no beneﬁts of a more analytic
relative to an intuitive reasoning approach.7,8 These
studies differ not only in their ﬁndings. They also seem
to be referring to different sorts of reﬂection. What
reﬂection in medical diagnosis entails and how it
affects the quality of physicians’ decisions are still to
be determined. We will explore these questions by
reviewing the existing literature in particular on
empirical research that has employed different forms
of reﬂective diagnostic reasoning to study their impact
on diagnostic performance.
It has long been known that physicians can – and
usually do – generate diagnoses in the ﬁrst minutes of a
clinical encounter. They do so thanks to “pattern-
recognition”, a fast, largely unconscious, recognition
of similarities between the case at hand and illnessscripts that the physician has stored in memory, either
in the form of prototypes of diseases or examples of
previously seen patients.9 Illness scripts, when acti-
vated by cues in the patient's history, lead to generation
of one or a few diagnostic hypotheses and guide the
subsequent search for additional information to either
conﬁrm or refute the hypotheses.10 Pattern-recognition
tends to take place largely unconsciously, and physi-
cians are only aware of its outcome, that is, the
diagnostic hypothesis. Verifying this diagnostic
hypothesis requires analytic reasoning to match the
elements of the illness script with ﬁndings of the case
at hand.
The two modes of reasoning tend therefore to be
involved in diagnosis making. Nevertheless, it is the
intuitive reasoning that has been considered the hall-
mark of expertise and has traditionally caught much of
researchers’ attention. Only recently, the role of reﬂec-
tion in the diagnostic process has started to attract
interest, which has possibly been nurtured by two
factors. First, an increasing awareness of the problem
of diagnostic error and its adverse consequences for
patients. The magnitude of the problem has been
shown to be high, and the literature has associated
errors with relying on intuitive judgments that are not
sufﬁciently examined through analytic reasoning.11,12
Second, the prominence achieved by dual-processing
theories of reasoning and decision-making in the
psychology literature.13 Dual-processing theories have
been frequently applied to clinical reasoning and
diagnostic error in the medical literature1,14 and these
models, as we discuss below, tend to value the role of
reﬂection.
Brieﬂy, dual-processing theories distinguish between
two principal types of reasoning. System 1 processes
(sometimes labeled ‘Type 1’, ‘intuitive’, ‘implicit’ or
‘heuristic’) are unconscious, fast, automatic, and do not
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System 2 processes (also named ‘Type 2’, ‘analytic’,
‘explicit’ or ‘reﬂective’) are conscious, slow, delibera-
tive, and restricted by working memory capacity.13
System 1, largely based on prior experience, operates
through holistic recognition of a situation as of a kind
encountered previously, which retrieves from memory
a schema that brings a ‘solution’. System 2, on the
other hand, depends on application of rules (for
example, the rules of diagnosis that associate certain
symptoms with the likelihood of a particular disease)
and is therefore the type of reasoning that allows for
hypothetical thinking.
One of the most inﬂuential dual-process theories (for
reviews, see 13,15) the ‘heuristic-analytic’ theory,
advocates that the two reasoning modes are interde-
pendent and sequential: when we are confronted with a
problem, preconscious heuristic processes provide
default responses that may or may not be altered by
analytic reasoning.16 Very roughly, what happens is
that System 1 selects relevant aspects of presented
information, cueing a mental model of the problem that
leads to a response (for example, a diagnostic hypoth-
esis in a clinical problem). System 2 may or may not
intervene to revise or replace the mental model of the
problem and the response that comes with it (in a
clinical problem, System 2 intervention would for
example lead to recognition of contradictory ﬁndings,
bringing an alternative diagnosis under consideration).
As our processing capacity is limited, the theory
assumes that we tend to generate only one mental
model of the problem at a time. Moreover, we have a
universal tendency to satisﬁce with a plausible enough
model, unless we have good reasons to discard it. That
is, reﬂective reasoning is not our basic mode of thought
and in many situations it does not intervene, which
means that we simply go with responses triggered by
heuristic processes. Whether and to what extent System
2 comes into action depends on several factors, but two
of them have emerged from psychological research as
critical: availability of time for this more effortful mode
of reasoning, and strong, elaborate, instructions requir-
ing deductive reasoning.16,17
Dual-processing theories have been traditionally
investigated in experiments with reasoning problems
very different from medical diagnosis, but it should not
come as a surprise that they have become so popular in
the literature on diagnostic error. Their account seems
to match the diagnostic process quite well: pattern-
recognition (System 1) triggered by a patient's cues
leads to generation of a hypothesis, and reﬂective
reasoning (System 2) enters into action to verify it bychecking whether the patient's ﬁndings indeed ﬁt with
what would be expected were the initial hypothesis
correct. Failure to engage in reﬂection for an appro-
priate veriﬁcation of initial hypotheses would make
physicians prone to fall prey of cognitive biases and
premature closure.1,2,14 This account of diagnostic error
abounds in the literature but has been questioned by
authors who point to its lack of empirical support.3,4
Indeed, while additional thought on to-be-diagnosed
problems led to substantial improvements in some
studies5,6 it did not bring any beneﬁt in others.8,18
Whether reasoning modes affect the quality of diag-
noses has therefore been a source of much discussion,
and it may be difﬁcult to make sense of the existing
research.
In the present review of the literature, we intended to
contribute to clarify this controversy by addressing two
questions. First, how reﬂective diagnostic reasoning
has been conceived in the literature? Different studies
seem to have employed very different instructions to
induce their participants to reﬂect upon to-be-solved
problems, an indication that distinct views of the nature
of reﬂective reasoning exist. Second, what is the effect
of reﬂection during the reasoning process on its
outcomes? At ﬁrst glance, the literature shows contra-
dictory ﬁndings, leaving it unclear if the accuracy of
diagnoses is affected by which reasoning mode pro-
duced them. As different constructs of reﬂective
diagnostic reasoning seem to exist, it may be worth
exploring whether and how its effects and its conceived
nature are associated.
We approached these two questions from the per-
spective of the dual-processing theories of reasoning
applied to medical diagnosis. In the next section, we
will describe how we used this theoretical framework
to categorize the papers identiﬁed in our search and to
summarize their ﬁndings.
Methods
We searched the PubMed and the Web of Science
databases for papers published until June 2016 which
contained the terms “reﬂection”; “diagnostic reason-
ing”; “reﬂective reasoning”; “critical thinking”; “ana-
lytic reasoning”; “non-analytic reasoning”; “pattern-
recognition”; and “medical diagnosis” in the title or
in the abstract. The search query for the Web of
Science search was the following: ((“reﬂective reason-
ing” OR “analytic reasoning” OR “non-analytic reason-
ing” OR (“pattern recognition” NEAR reasoning) OR
“critical thinking” OR (reﬂection NEAR diagnosis))
AND (“diagnostic reasoning” OR (medic* AND
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was modeled on it. We limited our search to English
papers indexed as articles, proceeding papers or
reviews.
This database search led to 144 papers. Our review
questions focused on the nature of physicians’ reﬂec-
tive diagnostic reasoning and its effect on their
diagnostic performance. The two authors ﬁrst read the
abstracts of the papers to identify the potentially
relevant ones. Papers dealing with topics beyond the
scope of our review questions, such as the development
of assessment tools or the effectiveness of educational
interventions to teach diagnostic reasoning, were
excluded. Thirty-ﬁve papers remained, and their full
text was obtained for full review. The database search
was then supplemented by manually reviewing the
bibliographies of the 35 articles and the authors’
personal archives. Eleven additional papers were iden-
tiﬁed, leading to a total of 46 papers to be fully
reviewed.
We built upon dual-process theories as applied to
medical diagnosis to categorize these papers according
to two dimensions. The ﬁrst was the phase of the
diagnostic process to which reﬂection was applied.
According to the heuristic-analytic theory, implicit
reasoning generates hypothesis and it is the work of
analytic reasoning to exam them. Based on this theory,
we distinguished between studies that requested parti-
cipants to engage in reﬂective reasoning either
(i) during generation of diagnostic hypotheses, (ii)
during veriﬁcation of diagnostic hypotheses, or (ii)
throughout the diagnostic process. The second dimen-
sion that we took into consideration was the type of
reasoning instructions used in the studies, if any, as this
factor has been shown to inﬂuence System 2 interven-
tion in psychological research.16,17 We distinguished
between studies that provided participants with
(i) speciﬁc reasoning instructions, (ii) general instruc-
tions (e.g. “be careful and consider all the data”), or
(iii) no reasoning instructions.
All empirical papers were categorized according to
these categories and their ﬁndings were summarized.
The ﬁrst 10 papers in the list of references were
independently categorized by the two authors, and as
they agreed in all of them, the categorization proceed
with one single author.
Results
Thirty-one out of the 46 papers reviewed reported on
empirical studies, 25 of which investigated the inﬂu-
ence of different reasoning approaches on diagnosticperformance either of students or physicians.5–8,18–36
The remaining 15 articles consisted of theoretical
papers that reviewed the literature on reasoning modes
employed by physicians during the diagnostic process
and their inﬂuence on the quality of diag-
noses.1,3,9,14,37–46 Interesting to notice, 12 out of these
15 papers addressed diagnostic reasoning in the light of
dual-processing theories, which testiﬁes for the inﬂu-
ence that these theories have acquired in research on
clinical reasoning.
Applying the two dimensions adopted to categorize
the papers – the phase of the diagnostic process in
which reﬂection was triggered and the type of instruc-
tion provided to participants – led to the matrix
displayed in Table 1. To summarize the results of the
review, we will group the papers according to the phase
in which reﬂection was requested. Within each group
of papers, we will then distinguish between the
different types of instructions employed and summarize
the existing empirical ﬁndings.
Reﬂection for the generation of diagnostic hypothesis
Four23,29,35,36 out of the 31 empirical papers required
participants to engage in reﬂective reasoning for the
generation of initial diagnostic hypotheses. All studies
provided participants with speciﬁc reasoning instruc-
tions on how to do this.
The typical approach adopted in these studies may be
exempliﬁed by the procedure used by Kulatunga–Moruzi
and collaborators to compare the effects of intuitive and
analytic reasoning strategies on novice students’ diagnos-
tic performance on dermatological cases.23 Participants
were ﬁrst exposed, during a training phase, to a set of
diseases and their key features, usually provided in a
response sheet that lists the features relevant for the
diagnoses of the cases used in the study. The training
phase aimed at generating familiarity with the diseases,
allowing for subsequent diagnosis to be made on the basis
of similarity to the cases previously seen. Immediately
after the training, students were requested to diagnose
new cases either by providing a quick diagnosis based on
similarity or by following instructions for analytic reason-
ing. The latter asked students to ﬁrst identify, with the aid
of the list of possible relevant clinical features, which
features were present in the to-be-diagnosed case and
only after that give a diagnosis. A similar approach was
employed in subsequent studies on novice students’
performance while diagnosing ECGs, but the compar-
isons then involved not only this ‘reﬂection / features-
ﬁrst’ approach and the similarity-based diagnosis.35,36 A
‘combined approach’ was included, which requested
Table 1
Studies according to the phase of the diagnostic process in which reﬂection was triggered and the type of instructions employed to activate
reﬂection.
Speciﬁc reasoning
instructions provided
Non-speciﬁc (‘Be careful.
Consider all the data’)
NO instructions
provided
Undeﬁned or non-
applicable
Reﬂection for the generation of
diagnostic hypothesis
Ark et al. 35*
Ark et al. 36*
Kulatunga-Moruzi et al. 23
Regehr et al. 29
Reﬂection for the veriﬁcation of
diagnostic hypothesis
Ark et al. 35* Monteiro et al. 28 Jaimes et al. 22
Ark et al. 36* Sibbald et al. 31
Mamede et al. 5
Mamede et al. 26
Mamede et al. 24
Schmidt et al. 6
Mamede et al. 24
Sibbald et al. 32
Sibbald et al. 33
Groves et al. 47
Groves et al. 48
Shimizu et al. 30
Sibbald et al. 34
Reﬂection throughout the diagnostic
process
Ilgen et al. 7 Sherbino et al. 8 Coderre et al. 19
Ilgen et al. 21 Norman et al. 18 Mamede et al. 50
Hess et al. 20
Mamede et al. 25
Undeﬁned or non-applicable Dong et al. 51
Durning et al. 52
Durning et al. 53
Michelsen et al. 54
Stolper et al. 55
*The studies compared two reasoning modes and they are therefore included in both categories.
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similarity and subsequently check if it was correct by
going through the provided list of features. In the
‘combined approach’, reﬂection was therefore triggered
only for the veriﬁcation of initial diagnoses by instruc-
tions that compelled participants to deductive reasoning.
These papers are therefore also included in the subsequent
section.
What have these studies shown about the effects of
reﬂection on diagnostic performance? The ‘reﬂection /
features-ﬁrst’ reasoning approach did not increase
accuracy relative to simply request students to diagnose
dermatological cases or ECGs based on similarity to
previously seen ones (i.e., by pattern-recogni-
tion).23,35,36 This ﬁnding replicated what had beenobserved with medical residents in a previous study.29
However, the ‘combined approach’ proved more effec-
tive than both ‘reﬂection/features-ﬁrst’ and pattern-
recognition in the two studies that compared the
inﬂuence of these four approaches on students’ perfor-
mance while diagnosing ECGs.35,36
These studies suggest that no beneﬁt is to be
expected from reﬂecting for generating initial diagno-
sis, at least not if this means ﬁrstly identifying all
features that are possibly relevant in the case. While
explaining the poor results of the reﬂection/features-
ﬁrst approach, the authors argued that trying to list
features unguided by a diagnostic hypothesis exposes
the diagnostician to the risk of being led astray by an
incoherent list of features that cannot be combined into
S. Mamede, H.G. Schmidt / Health Professions Education 3 (2017) 15–2520a diagnosis.35 Their argument is supported by their
ﬁnding that participants required to ﬁrst list features
identiﬁed more features indicative of incorrect diag-
noses than did participants in the other conditions.
Notice that the instructions used for the reﬂection/
features-ﬁrst approach in these studies suggest that
reﬂective reasoning has been conceptualized as a sort
of categorization task based on prototype theories,
requiring going through lists of features to match
existing features with those belonging to alternative
categories. Differently, the instructions for the ‘com-
bined-approach’ seem consistent with a view of reﬂec-
tion shared by the studies discussed in the following
section.
Reﬂection for the veriﬁcation of diagnostic hypothesis
Out of the 31 empirical studies, 16 induced partici-
pants to reﬂect primarily for the veriﬁcation of their
initial diagnostic hypotheses. Participants were requested
to follow speciﬁc reasoning instructions in 13 of these
studies,5,6,24,26,27,30,32–36,47,48 whereas 2 studies provided
general instructions28,31 and in 1 study no instruction
was given.22
When participants were provided with speciﬁc
reasoning instructions, two main approaches have been
adopted: a step-by-step procedure to check predictions
of initial diagnostic hypothesis against data from the
case and search for contradictory evidence, and the use
of checklists for diagnosis veriﬁcation. The former can
be exempliﬁed by a procedure used in several studies
with internal medicine residents.5,6,24,26,27 Participants
were requested to (1) read the case and write down the
most likely diagnosis as fast as possible but without
compromising accuracy; (2) list the ﬁndings in the case
description that support this diagnosis, the ﬁndings that
speak against it, and the ﬁndings that would be
expected to be present if this diagnosis were true but
that were not described in the case; (3) list alternative
diagnoses if the initial diagnosis generated for the case
had proved to be incorrect and proceed with the same
analysis for each alternative diagnosis; and (4) draw a
conclusion on their diagnosis for the case.
This procedure has been employed not only to
compare the effect of intuitive and reﬂective reasoning
on diagnostic performance5,24,26 but also to explore
whether reﬂective reasoning can counteract availability
bias, which causes physicians to misdiagnose a similar-
looking, but different, case as the disease seen
before.6,27 A similar procedure was also adopted in
two studies that intended to explore the characteristics
of experienced physicians’ reasoning and the types oferrors made at different levels of clinical expertise by
distinguishing between failures in hypothesis genera-
tion or in identiﬁcation or interpretation of relevant
information.47,48
The second approach adopted when speciﬁc reason-
ing instructions were provided requested participants to
reﬂect upon their ﬁrst diagnosis for a clinical problem
guided by a checklist.30,32–36 For example, a checklist
containing key variables in ECG interpretation (e.g.,
chamber hypertrophy, abnormal intervals) was used in a
study that compared performance when participants
from different levels of expertise interpreted sets of
ECGs either as they normally would do or by using the
checklist for the veriﬁcation of their initial diagnoses.34
Checklists have been also used in studies with non-
visual materials. Sibbald et al. requested internal med-
icine residents to exam a high-ﬁdelity cardiopulmonary
simulator, provide a diagnosis, and subsequently verify
their initial diagnoses by using a checklist with the major
aspects of a cardiac exam.32 To determine whether the
veriﬁcation alone improved diagnostic accuracy or
whether this beneﬁt depended on the possibility of
collecting additional information (or re-assessing accu-
racy of initially collected one), they manipulated permis-
sion to re-examine the simulator.
A distinction between two types of checklist is
noteworthy. The studies by Sibbald et al. have employed
checklists speciﬁc to the problem domain. Their items
direct the user to re-check features of the case (for
example, in the study of physical cardiac exam, ‘murmur
radiation?’; ‘extra sounds?’). However, general ‘de-
biasing checklists’ have also been suggested to prevent
errors.30,49 They consist of questions about the user's
reasoning process (‘did I consider the inherent ﬂaws of
heuristic thinking’? or ‘was my judgment affected by
any other bias?’). A study by Shimizu et al. compared
the effect of these two types of checklists on medical
students’ diagnostic performance.30
In the aforementioned studies, participants followed
a procedure that speciﬁed how to reason through the
problem to verify their initial diagnosis, but speciﬁc
instructions such as those have not always been
provided. In three studies,22,28,31 participants were
requested to diagnose cases and, subsequently, diag-
nose the case again. In this second pass, they were
simply asked to go through all the cases again or
provided with a general instruction such as ‘carefully
reconsider every diagnosis’.28
The studies within this category seem to be built
upon a view of reﬂection as a process of scrutinizing
the grounds of a previously made intuitive judgment to
either conﬁrm or discard it, in line therefore with the
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the studies differ in their assumption about how
reﬂection can be induced. Whereas some studies
employed strong deductive reasoning instructions,
others seem to have assumed that reﬂective reasoning
can be put into action simply by requesting participants
to review their initial diagnoses.
The ﬁndings of these studies suggest this distinction
between reﬂection triggers to be worth making. When
reﬂection upon initial diagnosis was activated by
speciﬁc reasoning instructions, it led to a substantial
increase in diagnostic accuracy relative to diagnosis
made through intuitive reasoning. In two studies with
internal medicine residents, for instance, the gain in
accuracy after participants reﬂected upon their initial
diagnoses for complex cases was close to 40% or even
higher.5,24 Deliberate reﬂection also counteracted the
negative consequences of availability bias. When
physicians made wrong initial diagnoses because they
confounded the to-be-diagnosed case with a disease
seen before, reﬂection restored accuracy to the levels
observed on cases that were not subject to bias.6,27 The
performance of novice students35 and expert physi-
cians33 in interpreting ECGs also improved substan-
tially when they revised their initial diagnoses by using
a checklist. A speciﬁc diagnostic checklist was also
useful for medical students to revise their initial
diagnoses for complex internal medicine cases,30 lead-
ing to gains in accuracy similar to those observed when
residents engaged in deliberate reﬂection in other
studies.5,24
Reﬂection seemed to be also beneﬁcial when parti-
cipants were simply requested to review their initial
diagnoses without the provision of reasoning instruc-
tions, but the ﬁndings were not so clear-cut, and gains,
when present, were less impressive. Dermatologists, for
instance, improved their initial diagnoses on average in
around 10% when requested to review each of them.22
And when physicians were left to decide by themselves
whether they would review their initial diagnoses or
not, this choice was made for only 8% of the diagnoses
despite the fact that the accuracy was around 60%.28
The scores for these revised diagnoses increased
substantially (from 0.64 to 0.90), but as the option
for reconsidering was so rarely made, reﬂection led to a
minimal (from 1.20/2 to 1.22/2), though signiﬁcant,
increase in overall accuracy scores relative to intuitive
diagnosis. That elaborate reasoning instructions may
play a crucial role has been also shown by a study on
the use of checklists in ECGs interpretation. Veriﬁca-
tion of initial diagnoses only led to gains in accuracy
when guided by a checklist that directed physicians’attention to key features of ECGs; veriﬁcation alone
did not make a difference.33
The ﬁndings of the studies within this category bring
also some insight on how reﬂection helps improve
initial diagnoses. Two studies on types of errors in
clinical reasoning suggest that most of experienced
physicians’ mistakes derive from failures in identiﬁca-
tion and/or interpretation of relevant clinical ﬁnd-
ings.47,48 In Sibbald's study with the cardiopulmonary
simulator, when physicians reﬂected upon their initial
diagnoses without being allowed to go back to the case
to review its features, reﬂection did not help.32 How-
ever, physicians compelled to go through the case
again were able to correct initial mistakes,5,24,32 even
when this required overcoming the inﬂuence of con-
textual information that had originally biased reason-
ing.6,27 Taken together, these studies suggest that
reﬂective reasoning helps by leading physicians to
identify relevant features that had previously passed
unnoticed or to re-interpret case ﬁndings. Recognizing
critical features that were initially overlooked seems to
be only possible when the diagnostician is confronted
with evidence from the case by looking at the problem
rather than at one's reasoning,30 and for those who
possess relevant knowledge, as suggested by the
students’ failure to beneﬁt from reﬂection on cases
that were far beyond their reach.24
Reﬂection throughout the diagnostic process
In 8 out of the 31 empirical studies, participants were
requested to reﬂect (or considered to have reﬂected)
throughout the whole diagnostic process, i.e., both
during generation of diagnostic hypothesis and during
its veriﬁcation.7,8,18–21,25,50 This category comprises
studies that explicitly requested participants to reﬂect
upon to-be-solved cases as well as studies that simply
examined the relationship between time on diagnosis
and performance. Despite different in their design,
these studies seem to share a conceptualization of
reﬂection as taking place throughout the whole diag-
nostic process, deviating therefore from the heuristic-
analytic dual process theory.
In one of these studies, reﬂection was triggered by
simply requesting participants to “consider all the data”
to make a diagnosis, not in a second pass that would
review previously made diagnoses but from the start of
the diagnostic process.18 Two other studies provided
speciﬁc reasoning strategies7,21 that led participants
through a step-by-step process: ﬁrst providing a sum-
mary of the problem representation, then listing all the
diagnoses considered for the case and indicating
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making a decision. (Notice that the ﬁrst two steps
already involve considerable reﬂection) Finally, four
papers that referred to reﬂection throughout the whole
diagnostic process did not provide any reasoning
instruction.19,20,25,50 This happened, for instance, in
an observational study of response data of a large
group of residents who took the American Board of
Internal Medicine certiﬁcation exam.20 Time spent on
initial responses to questions that consisted of diagnos-
ing clinical vignettes and changes in initial responses
were taken as indication of reﬂection, and relationship
with diagnostic accuracy was evaluated. No reasoning
instructions were provided also in experimental studies
that aimed at investigating factors that induce physi-
cians to move from a more intuitive to reﬂective
reasoning, such as case ambiguity or physicians’
perception of the complexity of the to-be-solved
problem.25,50
Among the studies within this category, those that
explored the inﬂuence of reasoning mode on diagnostic
accuracy led to contradictory ﬁndings. Ilgen and
colleagues applied the same basic set up in two
experiments and yet reached different conclusions:
while reﬂection led to higher diagnostic accuracy
relative to intuitive reasoning in the ﬁrst experiment,21
no difference between conditions was found in the
second one.7 The authors attributed this contradiction
to slight methodological differences that may have led
participants to apply reﬂection primarily for diagnosis
veriﬁcation in the ﬁrst experiment, which would have
allowed them to gain from it.7
When time spent in diagnosis was employed as a
proxy for reﬂection, ﬁndings are again not consistent.
Reﬂection triggered by providing information that the
to-be-solved cases were extremely complex improved
diagnoses in 27% relative to intuitive reasoning.25 This
ﬁnding conﬂicts with the results of two studies by the
same research group, which showed diagnostic accu-
racy to be similar under conditions that encouraged
residents to be fast or instructed them to take as much
time as they wished to consider all the data.8,18 The
latter group indeed took longer on average to diagnose
each clinical vignette though the time difference –
around 20 s – seems too small to allow for the authors’
consideration of this diagnostic process as “careful,
thorough and reﬂective”. Nevertheless, as cases diag-
nosed incorrectly took longer than those diagnosed
correctly, the authors suggested that adopting a more
analytic reasoning, consequently spending more time,
is not beneﬁcial. Indeed the relationship between time
on diagnosis and accuracy seems to be far morecomplex, as suggested by a large study of residents’
diagnostic responses in a high-stake exam.20 Less time
spent on diagnosis was also associated with more
correct responses but only for low-complexity clinical
vignettes and for low-ability residents. For complex
cases, spending more time was associated with more
correct responses, and residents with high cognitive
ability beneﬁtted from reﬂection in both easy and
complex clinical cases. The study suggests that a
certain level of competence is required for reﬂection
to help, in line with previous ﬁndings showing students
to fail to beneﬁt from reﬂection when cases were
extremely complex to them.24
Discussion
Interest in reﬂective reasoning in medical diagnosis
has grown together with concerns about the problem of
diagnostic error and its adverse consequences for
patients. The increasing inﬂuence of dual-process
theories in psychological research has nurtured this
interest, but whether reﬂection has a role to play in
minimizing diagnostic errors has been a source of
much debate. We reviewed the literature to examine
how reﬂective diagnostic reasoning has been conceived
in the studies on medical diagnosis and whether it
affects diagnostic performance. Research on the theme
is in its ﬁrst years, and we identiﬁed a limited number
of studies, but a large fraction of them consists of
empirical research. These empirical studies were cate-
gorized according to two dimensions: the phase of the
diagnostic process in which reﬂection has been mobi-
lized and the type of instruction (if any) employed to
trigger reﬂection. Empirical ﬁndings were summarized,
and a number of conclusions could be made.
First, the moment of the diagnostic process in which
reﬂection is activated, which reveals different conceptua-
lizations of reﬂective reasoning, apparently determines
whether reﬂection affects diagnostic performance. When
reﬂection was brought into action in the phase of
diagnosis veriﬁcation, it substantially increased diagnostic
accuracy relative to non-analytic diagnostic reasoning. In
these studies, reﬂection is conceived as a deliberate
consideration of a diagnosis previously generated through
intuitive reasoning to examine the grounds that support it.
This view is in line with the heuristic-analytic dual
process theory, which advocates that System 2 intervenes
to revise the mental representation of the problem and the
solution for the problem previously generated by System
1. Reﬂection does not seem to help when it is mobilized
only for the generation of a diagnostic hypothesis, at least
if it consists of identifying all features in a case before
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not so clear when it is requested to take place throughout
the whole diagnostic process.
The literature allows for a second conclusion.
Reﬂection tends to be much more effective with the
aid of a procedure that compels physicians to search for
ﬂaws in their initial judgments. A close look into the
ﬁndings of the studies that induced reﬂection for
diagnosis veriﬁcation supports this statement. Studies
that employed elaborate instructions, either in the form
of a step-by-step procedure5,6,24,27 or of check-
lists,30,32–34 showed a much larger effect of reﬂection
on accuracy than the studies that provided only a
general instruction28 or no guidance for the veriﬁca-
tion.22 Moreover, a study that compared the beneﬁts of
verifying initial diagnoses of ECGs with or without
guidance found that veriﬁcation only improved pre-
vious decisions when guided by instructions on what to
check for.33
It seems clear that, in line with what has been found
in psychological research, elaborate reasoning instruc-
tions optimize the potential of reﬂection to improve
diagnosis. What is not clear is why this is so. It may be
simply because the instructions increase the frequency
with which physicians opt for checking the grounds of
their initial judgments about the case. Physicians, as
anybody else, do not tend to adopt reﬂective reasoning
as their routine mode of thought. Indeed, when given
the possibility of reviewing their initial diagnoses, they
rarely opted to do so even if their diagnostic perfor-
mance was far from optimal.20,28 Provided with a list of
items to be checked, they would tend to skip the
veriﬁcation less frequently. It may also be, however,
that the nature of the instructions plays a crucial role by
favouring restructuring of initial reasoning. We all have
a natural tendency to satisﬁce with our initial explana-
tion for a problem and stick to it unless a reason
emerges which is strong enough to convince us that our
explanation should be abandoned.13,16 Physicians will
also tend to go with their initial, intuitive judgments
unless confrontation with sufﬁcient conﬂicting evi-
dence compels them to change their mind. When
speciﬁc instructions were used to guide reﬂection upon
initial diagnoses, they requested physicians to go
through the case again and search for evidence that
contradicted initial judgments or check speciﬁc, poten-
tially relevant features. This process possibly redirects
physicians’ attention to features in the case that may
have been initially overlooked or leads to re-
interpretation of case features, activating other illness
scripts and bringing other diagnostic hypothesis to
mind. For reﬂection to help, it apparently has tointerfere with the original diagnostic reasoning. With-
out being confronted with contradictory evidence,
initial reasoning may remain untouched. If this is
correct, it may help to explain the absence of any
effect of the few extra seconds spent in diagnosing the
case by participants under the ‘analytic condition’ in
studies on the relationship between time and accu-
racy.8,18 While spending more time is certainly a
requirement for diagnostic reﬂective reasoning to take
place, time per se may not be sufﬁcient. It may also be
a reason why a checklist to guide thinking about the
problem itself improved students’ diagnoses whereas
one requiring thinking about one's own reasoning
produced no gains.30
Finally, the ﬁndings of the studies suggest that
reﬂection may be a powerful tool to improve diag-
noses, but its potential is affected by an interaction
between the to-be-solved problem and the diagnosti-
cian. Reﬂection helps when there is ﬂoor for mistakes.
When cases were so straightforward that intuitive
judgment led to accuracy scores close to the maximum,
reﬂecting upon the initial diagnosis did not add
much.5,24,30 On the other hand, reﬂection can only
act by mobilizing existing knowledge, and therefore
nothing was gained from reﬂecting upon cases that
were far beyond the diagnostician's expertise.24
To sum up, the literature is scarce but the existing
empirical studies support the claim that reﬂective
reasoning in medical diagnosis improves accuracy
and can be a tool to minimize errors. This only seems
to happen, however, when reﬂective reasoning is
conceived as reﬂection upon initial diagnosis generated
through more intuitive reasoning and involves scruti-
nizing its grounds through confrontation with evidence
from the case. Although the literature provides insights
on factors that inﬂuence the beneﬁts of reﬂection for
diagnostic reasoning, further research is required to
clarify the circumstances under which reﬂection helps
and how its potential can be optimized.
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